We thank Matteo Cassiani for providing us with bank data. We are grateful to two referees and the editor of the journal for constructive comments and suggestions.
INTRODUCTION
The financial tsunami of the 2007-2009 crisis produced massive expenditure commitments on the part of governments aimed at shoring up their national banking systems. Governments intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the crisis. At first, governments reacted to the sharp declines in equity prices with disjointed and ad-hoc interventions. The failure of Lehman on September 15, 2008 was a watershed and prompted policymakers in the next two months to implement programs addressing systemic problems, such as the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United States and the £500 billion banking recapitalization program in the United Kingdom. The initial objective of purchasing sub-standard illiquid assets ran into difficulties because, without a market, governments were likely to either overvalue "toxic" assets, thus penalizing taxpayers, or undervaluing them, thus penalizing potential sellers. Governments then adjusted their policy by either recapitalizing financially distressed banks (e.g., in the United States) or nationalizing them (e.g., in the United Kingdom). In December 2008 and January 2009, governments tried to douse the fire of the crisis by targeting specific large banks (e.g., Commerzbank and Citigroup); they were unsuccessful. In February and March 2009, additional general measures were taken, this time with a focus to relieve banks of bad assets. At the same time, many indebted US banks began repaying the US government, while in Europe the number of banks that had signaled their intention for government assistance declined (Wilson and Wu, 2012) .
In this paper, we examine the impact of these interventions by measuring the market's reaction to their announcements. Hence, we take the viewpoint of bank shareholders. To do so, we create an original dataset that distinguishes government announcements directed at the banking system as a whole (general announcements) from those directed at specific banks (specific announcements) in the spirit of the distinction made by Carvalho et al. (2010) . Then, we apply event-study methodology to estimate the impact of government interventions on bank valuation.
The maintained hypothesis is that the announcement of a rescue plan is credible if it affects rates of return of the targeted banks. We test for these effects by computing cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and abnormal risks of the participating banks around a window that includes announcement dates.
We perform three separate tests on our sample of large banks. The first estimates the overall impact on banks' equity value of the two types of rescue announcements; the second estimates whether bank size impacts on announcement effects; and the third considers announcements of different types. Our traditional parametric approach shows that general and specific announcements were priced by the markets as CAR and abnormal risks over the selected time windows. In particular, general announcements were associated with positive CAR and decreasing abnormal risks, whereas specific announcements were associated with negative CAR and increasing abnormal risks. However, when we apply more modern techniques to control for auto-correlation and crosscorrelation dependence -that is, correcting for both bank and time effects-announcement coefficients lose statistical significance. This reversal is robust to different estimators, traditional as well as modern, and is not driven by sample selection, the length of the event window, or multiple announcements. The findings are consistent either with announcements being not credible or related to rescue programs of inadequate size relative to the underlying problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 examines event-study methodology and describes our testable equations. Data are presented in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 employ, respectively, traditional and recent event-study methodology to estimate the impact of government interventions on bank valuation. Section 7 presents findings using a mixed estimation method. Section 8 tests the robustness of results. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.
RECENT LITERATURE
The recent event-study literature shows that announcements by governments or international institutions tend to have weak or mixed effects on bank valuation. During the Asian crisis of 1997, IMF program announcements increased bank shareholder wealth only marginally, with the exception of South Korea (Kho and Stulz, 2000) ; East Asian government announcements of debt guarantees, instead, exerted a stronger positive impact on bank stock prices. Klingebiel et al. (2001) argue that these announcements, however, were not credible because the same announcements exerted a negative impact on stock prices of non-financial firms. Banks' stock prices were unaffected by participation announcements because infusions took the form of preferred non-dilutive stock. Under the latter, instead, capital infusion took the form of common equity and included stress tests that conveyed a significant certification effect. The authors employ a large sample of 590 publicly traded US banks and use sequential logit to estimate participation incentives in the two programs and a standard event study to evaluate the impact of participation announcements. Elyasiani et al. (2011) investigate investors' reactions to the announcements of private equity offerings and TARP capital injections using an event study methodology. Investors react negatively to private equity offerings, whereas the opposite takes place with respect to TARP capital injections. Black and Hazelwood (2012) examine the impact of TARP capital injections on risk-taking by targeted banks and find heterogeneity between large and small TARP banks. Finally, Huerta et al. (2011) French plan reduced banks' credit risk and financing costs but had a mixed impact on equity: the gross impact measured by raw stock returns was positive but economically small, whereas the adjusted impact, measured by CAPM abnormal returns, was statistically significant but economically very negative.
Panel studies reveal even more ambiguous effects than country studies. Panetta et al. (2009:2) find that government interventions were effective in reducing banks' default risk, albeit "banks' equities showed [only] a slightly positive reaction." These outcomes could be explained by a variety of factors, such as capital injections dilute investors' earning and voting rights, governments become so involved with banks to reduce investors' perception of their long-run profitability, or that a non-credible exit strategy might raise the uncertainty on the duration of public interventions. Klomp (2010) considers the effectiveness of government announcements on CDS premia using a multilevel quantile regressions and finds that "the effect of government interventions is heterogeneous across the risk distribution of a bank" (p. 20). King (2009) , employing country-bycountry time series, uncovers that the announcement impact is heterogeneous across countries, with positive effects on US banks and negative ones on European banks. An interesting paper by Carvalho et al. (2010) studies how the subprime financial crisis affected the lending relationship between borrowers and banks during the first phase of the financial crisis encompassing the collapse of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brother. These authors use a relatively large sample of publicly traded firms located in 34 countries and distinguish events producing "diverse effects […] among banks" (p. 3) in response to announcements of asset write-downs of individual banks. The salient finding of the paper is that during the period in question the financial shock was transmitted from banks to relationship borrowers. The study also finds a positive and statistically significant link between the relationship borrower's stock return and the return of its main bank that reported an asset a write-down over a week event window.
Our paper differs from the previous literature in four ways. First, our sample of large banks covers 19 countries and, hence, permits a much richer experience than the US TARP, other individual countries, and previous panel studies. Second, we examine a longer crisis period, starting from the date of the Lehman failure to the end of 2009 that includes multiple announcements. Third, we employ an even-study parameter as opposed to standard event study: this methodology is more flexible in hypothesis testing and in controlling for bank and time effects. Fourth, we subject the hypothesis to a long battery of tests aimed at ascertaining the robustness of our results. Finally, we distinguish between general and specific announcements and between announcements of capital injections and those of asset and debt guarantees.
EMPIRICAL MODEL

Methodology
The rescue of several large financial institutions in the United States and in Europe was sparked by the migration of liquidity risk from banks to other financial institutions and followed the rapidly expanding role of government as a market maker of last resort to support, not only big banking, but also big finance. We employ event-study methodology to estimate markets' reaction to the announcements of government interventions.
Event-study methodology goes back to the 1930s (Dolley, 1933) , but became ubiquitous in capital markets research after important contributions by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) . The spreading popularity of this technique, however, was accompanied by modifications of the original setup that implied violations of the underlying statistical assumptions (MacKinlay, 1997) . Corrections and practical adjustments to these practices surfaced in the second half of 1970s (Serra, 2002; Corrado, 2009) . There is now agreement that the general setup of this methodology consists of three stages: the identification of an event of interest and its timing; the specification of a valuation model; and an analysis and computation of CAR around the event date (De Jong, 2007:2) .
The procedure can be implemented in two alternative ways (Binder, 1998) . The first is a two-step approach, in which a valuation model is first estimated over a control (pre-event) estimation period and then CAR is computed as cumulative residuals of the valuation model over an event window (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990) . The second is an event-parameter approach, in which the valuation model is estimated over the combined estimation and event periods, and includes dummy variables over a relevant event window (Meulbroek, 1992) .
The two approaches are unbiased and equivalent under the assumption of serially independent and normally distributed returns and non-overlapping event windows (Corrado, 2009) .
Conversely, problems arise in the presence of overlapping windows, multiple events, aggregation of abnormal returns across firms, cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation, event-induced volatility and event-induced returns (Pynnönen, 2005; De Jong, 2007) . A number of these statistical problems can be overcome with the regression framework (Binder, 1998) . In our case, general announcements are clearly overlapping because they influence all banks in a country; furthermore, if different countries were to coordinate their policies, overlapping would be exacerbated. Also, public interventions become multiple events when the same bank receives subsidies repeatedly during the crisis. In the presence of overlapping multiple events, Binder (1998) suggests the use of event-parameter methodology because it allows more simple and efficient estimates, it is more flexible in hypothesis testing, and it avoids aggregation problems and information losses connected with the two-step approach.
Testable Equations
We propose three separate tests using the event-parameter methodology. The first aims at uncovering the overall impact on banks' equity value of general and specific announcements; the second at identifying too-big-to-fail or too-big-to-save policies; and the last test breaks down announcements by different types. In the first test, daily rates of returns on bank stock i of country j at time t, R ijt , are regressed on an intercept, capturing the risk-free rate of return, on the market rate of return, R M jt , and two dummy-event variables. The first, G jt , is equal to one during the event time window, T, around a general announcement; otherwise it is zero. The second, S it , is equal to one in the time window T around a specific announcement. These dummy variables capture the average shift over the event period on the intercept, i.e., the normal return. We interact also G jt and S it with R ijt to check for changes in risk-taking over the event period. The test is formalized as follows:
where Z indicates bank size and u denotes a well-behaved residual. In terms of returns, markets' reactions to announcements are captured by γ and δ: returns in the time window T are predicted to be different than returns in other periods; that is, the government-intervention event generates CAR.
Since the error of the regression must be zero on average, the null hypothesis is that CAR, within T, must also be zero. A rejection of the null hypothesis corroborates the presence of abnormal returns.
In (1), CAR are the sum of the estimates of parameters γ and δ multiplied by T (Meulbroek, 1992) .
In terms of risks, instead, the impact of general and specific announcements is measured respectively by λ and ρ. Both effects depend on market perception. General announcements are met by a positive market's reactions, both in terms of returns (γ>0) and market risk (λ <0), if they provide a credible safety net for the entire banking system. Specific announcements, instead, affect negatively equity valuation (δ<0) and market risk (ρ>0) because they provide the "news" that the targeted bank is financially distressed (King, 2009:24; Aït-Sahalia et al., 2010:4) .
The second test checks for announcement effects varying with bank size. Due to their key role in the national financial system, the largest banks are considered by governments too big to fail.
The implication is that public interventions could benefit disproportionally them against other banks (O'Hara and Shaw, 1990) . Black and Hazelwood (2012) , who analyze the effects of TARP, find an increase in risk-taking by large banks that received capital injections relative to non-TARP banks, whereas the opposite holds for small TARP banks relative to non-TARP banks. But, if resources allocated to rescue plans are insufficient, the largest banks could become too big to save and the effect of a public intervention becomes negative. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find empirical evidence that is consistent with too-big-to-save banks. We test the too-big-to-fail and toobig-to-save hypotheses by interacting bank size Z with general and specific announcements:
Significantly positive (negative) estimates of η and µ are consistent with a too-big-to-fail (too-bigto-save) policy.
The third test breaks down G and S by different intervention types. The formulation of the test is given by equation (3):
The only difference with respect to equation (1) is that announcement coefficients are now denoted with a subscript k to indicate their type. We distinguish between capital injection (CAP) and asset-and-debt guarantees (GUA). In (3), CAR for the k-type announcement is equal to the estimate of γ k and δ k times T. We expect abnormal returns of general and specific announcement for different types of interventions to be similar to those of equation (1). Effects on market risk will vary according to the intervention type. Capital injections increase market risk because of the higher degree of moral hazard consequent to the revelation of a soft government budget constraint. With asset-and-debt-guarantees, governments commit a future and uncertain financial expenditure should a negative event occur. This commitment is conditional on certain constraints and requirements imposed on banks. Under competition for limited resources, distressed banks feel they must meet requirements as a necessary condition to qualify for these guarantees. If this discipline effect dominates the moral hazard effect, market risk declines; if the conditions are reversed, market risk rises.
DATA
Our data set consists of daily rates of return (inclusive of dividends) of 19 national market indices and of 122 banks listed within these indices over the period from July 31, 2007 to December 31,
2009
. 1 The listed banks are shown in In sum, governments used a mix of general and specific interventions. Asset-and-debt guarantees are politically attractive because governments do not have to argue the case with legislators. They also entail little or no cash outlay and are a natural instrument when governments want to gamble for a possible resurrection of the banking system. This strategy was a defining characteristic of both the US Savings and Loans crisis of the Eighties and the long Japanese crisis of the Nineties, which was responsible for transforming "a relatively small cost into a staggeringly large one" (Glauber, 2000:102) . whereas the overall variability of SIZE m rises from 444 to 738, implying an increase in the between cross-sectional variability. The main message is that the financial crisis enlarged size differences among banks.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 , here]
The hypothesis underlying our analysis is that the announcement of a rescue plan is credible if it raises the rates of return of participating banks. Therefore, we can test the effects of rescue plans by computing CAR and abnormal risks of participating banks around an announcement-date window. Alpha, the risk-free rate, and beta, the market risk parameter, from the capital asset price model are estimated on daily returns. A general announcement is more complex than a specific announcement because it requires longer time for the market to process it; in addition, it is easier for the markets to obtain relevant information about general than specific announcements. For this reason, we apply different windows to the two types of announcements: a seven-day window for general announcements centered on the announcement date, and a five-day window for specific announcements centered on the announcement date. We exclude UK banks from the estimation because UK capital injections were in fact nationalizations that tend to be unfavorable to private 
TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Findings using dummies
The first test estimates the overall impact of 48 general and 130 specific announcements on banks' returns using the entire panel of 115 banks. We test equation (1) by aggregating all announcements (ALL). We recall that G and S have seven-day and five-day windows respectively. We experimented with different window lengths (see Section 8). We have added a relative bank size measured by the US dollar capitalization value of bank i relative to capitalization of all banks (SIZEREL). This variable turns out to have positive and statistically significant effects in nearly every regression. Table 3 reports estimates of the model using different specifications with dummy variables.
The first column reports the estimate in the pre-crisis period with the specification of column five.
4
The difference between PRE and POST beta is statistically significant, but economically small, corroborating the view that the failure of Lehman Brothers, although a critical event, does not represent a structural break for the capital asset pricing model. Hence, we rely on this model to draw inference from announcements and focus on POST to exploit the greater variability in the data. This approach works against our null hypothesis of no significant announcement effects because announcement coefficients are expected to be more statistically significant in the presence of higher data variability.
The first key finding of Table 3 is that all announcements are statistically very significant and exert a substantive economic impact on banks' market returns. The second column of the table estimates equation (1) with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). G-induced CAR are almost 4.3 percentage points higher than normal returns, while S-induced CAR are 1.9 percentage points lower than normal returns. 5 The opposite signs of the G and S coefficients reflect differences in the way markets evaluate the two types of announcements. A general announcement is taken as a signal that government wants to protect the banking systems: the banking industry, as a whole, receives support and shareholders gain "abnormally" high rates of return over the announcement window.
On the other hand, a specific announcement reveals previously unknown troubles. This pattern is corroborated also by the negative (positive) abnormal market risk for general (specific)
announcements. 6 Results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of individual institutions to 4 Results from specifications of column two through four are very similar. In principle, bailout announcements should be evaluated using bankruptcy as the benchmark. Not knowing a true benchmark crisis, we resort to the alternative of estimating a pre-crisis period from July 31, 2007 to September 14, 2008 CAR are obtained by multiplying G and S coefficients by the days of the event windows, respectively 7 and 5. 6 Our estimated betas are relatively high but much lower than those by Veronesi and Zingales (2010:348) .
ask for public assistance. The fear of being identified as a "bad apple" was also the reason why some banks were reticent to seek emergency lending from central banks.
Financial panel data are prone to two econometric problems. The first is that, in the presence of time-series dependence, the residuals of a given firm may be correlated across time periods and generate an unobserved firm effect (Wooldridge, 2007) . For example, banks could differ in terms of firm characteristics such as leverage and portfolio risk. The second is that, in the presence of a cross-section dependence, the residuals may be correlated across different firms and generate an unobserved time effect. For example, to the extent that the credibility of a bailout announcement depends on the fiscal conditions of the country making the announcement, overlapping announcements in multiple countries are qualitatively different from those occurring in single countries; also market returns may not capture idiosyncratic effects of the whole banking sector, which may distort the CAPM alpha and beta. We control for these differences by introducing firm and time effects. In light of the fact that these effects violate the independence assumption underlying OLS, this procedure leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. Traditionally, the finance literature has corrected this bias with a parametric approach (Petersen, 2009). The third column of the table reports Least-Square-Dummy-Variables (LSDV) estimates using bank dummies to control for unobserved specific characteristics that may influence bank performance. Bank dummies capture, not only different bank characteristics, but also country effects by virtue of the fact that each bank is specific to a given country. It follows that bank effects already embody differences in bailout announcements across countries and control for any country fixed effects. The null hypothesis that there is no difference between the specifications of columns two and three cannot be rejected according to the Likelihood Ratio test. This is confirmed by the similar estimates of G and S and their interaction with the market rate of return obtained by OLS.
Column four of Table 3 includes time dummies that are correlated with general events as well as with multiple announcements. These dummies control for worldwide disturbances.
Announcement effects weaken: G-induced CAR drop from 4.2 to 1.9 percent; S-induced CAR rise from -2.5 to -1.8 percent. Announcement impacts on abnormal risk strengthen: abnormal G beta switch from -0.0582 to 0.108 and abnormal S beta increases from 0.193 to 0.255. The overall conclusion is that the data display also time-series dependence. Column five includes both bank and time dummies. The fact that the results of column five are closer to those of column four than to those of column three suggests that time effects dominate bank effects. Column five is the benchmark specification of Table 3 .
Two other important findings emerge from Table 3 . The first is that there is evidence of neither too-big-to-fail nor of too-big-to-save policy, shown by statistically insignificant interaction terms of relative bank size with G (column six). The second is that markets seem to sort out the relative efficacy of different announcement types. The impact on R i is driven by capital injection announcements (positive for G CAP and negative for S CAP ). The market risk parameter beta rises with CAP for both types of announcements and S GUA , but declines with G GUA (column seven). In sum, capital injection announcements are consistent with the benchmark result (but not with OLS), whereas asset-and-debt-guarantee announcements show statistically insignificant CAR and an inconsistent sign, relative to the benchmark equation, for betas.
Robustness with Feasible Generalized Least Squares
In financial studies, Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) are used to improve upon OLS and LSDV estimation (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Gentry et al., 2003; Almazan et al., 2004 ). Yet, the literature points to at least three drawbacks when this technique is applied to event studies. The first is that estimating a high number of covariance parameters could "introduce even more inaccuracy into the standard errors than it eliminates" (Kolari and Pynnönen, 2010:3). In particular, FGLS tend to underestimate standard errors (SE) when the cross-sectional dimension increases (Beck and Katz, 1995) . The second is that FGLS require an accurate estimation of the variancecovariance matrix, whereas the correct model specification is rarely known in event studies. The third is that a mis-specified model could lead to inefficient test results also with a known variancecovariance matrix (Chandra and Balachandran, 1990) . Table 4 shows FGLS estimates of our three equations. 7 In column three we allow for bankspecific SE to follow an AR(1) process. The salient findings are that G-induced and S-induced CAR and beta are virtually the same as those of OLS (column two). When we specify a heteroskedastic error structure with cross-correlation, the intensity of announcement coefficients declines and the abnormal G beta remains negative (column four). 8 After rejecting the hypothesis of serial and crosssectional independence, we re-estimate equation (1) with an auto-correlated and cross-correlated error structure and find weaker announcement effects (column five). 9 Column five is the benchmark specification of Table 4 . Columns six and seven estimate equations (2) and (3) [Insert Tables 3 and 4 , here]
RECENT APPROACHES
Findings with clustered standard errors
The parametric dummy approach assumes that bank and time effects are time-invariant and common to all banks (Wooldridge, 2007) . In the presence of relevant omitted variables, the independence assumption of classic linear regression is violated because the error term becomes 7 Column one reports estimate over the pre-crisis period using the benchmark specification of column five. 8 Using time dummies, abnormal G beta is positive (column four of Table 3 ). 9 The serial correlation test, indicated by A-Corr in LSDV over-reject the null hypothesis of the coefficients being not significantly different from zero.
To avoid this overconfidence bias, we apply a cluster correction to SE, a method specifically designed to control for correlated residuals (Rogers, 1993) . Clustered SE do not assume any Treating our equations with clustered SE yields surprising results (Table 5) . With time dummies and clustering by banks, G coefficients maintain the same sign, intensity and statistical significance, but coefficients of abnormal S beta tend to lose some statistical significance (column three). With bank dummies and clustering by days, the impact of both G and S on R i vanishes (column four). Under double clustering by banks and days, not only the effects of announcements disappear (except, marginally, for S ALL ), but the impact of relative bank size becomes half the size of the regression with time clustered SE (column five). Column five is the benchmark model of Table 5 . In sum, once one controls for bank and time effects parametrically, announcement effects tend to fade away.
Differences are substantial also for equations (2) and (3). In contrast to LSDV and FGLS estimates, we find evidence consistent with a too-big-to-save policy: the negative and strongly statistical significance of SIZEREL*G ALL coefficient in column six of Table 5 suggest that the benefits from general announcements are bigger for small than for large banks. A possible explanation is that, under the constraint of small budgets, a subsidy competition may occur among banks. 12 Governments may gamble that it is better to save many small banks than one or two large banks. Finally, on the relative power of different intervention types, coefficients tend to be much less statistically significant than those of the corresponding specifications of Tables 3 and 4 : Ginduced CAR are statistically insignificant for both types of interventions, S-induced CAR are insignificant only for the asset-and-debt guarantee type, and three out of four abnormal betas are significant at least at the 10 percent level.
Robustness with Fama-MacBeth and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
Cluster correction yields more accurate SE than those obtained with OLS. But, given that this procedure "places no restriction on the correlation structure of the residuals within a cluster, its consistence depends on having a sufficient number of clusters" (Petersen, 2009:455) . With a low number of clusters, clustered SE underestimate the true SE. 13 Albeit our data sample consists of 115 banks and 329 working days, the large difference between the two dimension sizes could be still problematic for double clustering.
We check the robustness of the cluster correction results using two different methods. The first is by Fama and MacBeth (1973) who run a cross-sectional regression for each time period and use the time series of these estimates for the final estimates of the parameters and their SE. This procedure was originally designed to address a time effect: unbiased estimates are obtained averaging firm cross-section results of time-series regressions. The procedure can be also applied to firm effects, but not for both at the same time. The second method is by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) who estimate a variance-covariance matrix that is robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. Their method applies a Newey-West (1987) correction to the sequence of cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions and produces consistent SE independently of the number of clusters (Hoechle, 2007) . In other words, the Driscoll-Kraay method overcomes the limitations, not only of FGLS (i.e., known dependence structure) and double clustering (i.e., requirement of many clusters), but also of the Fama-MacBeth method (i.e., only one correlation dimension).
The results obtained using Fama-MacBeth and Driscoll-Kraay SE are shown in Table 6. 14 Under the standard Fama-MacBeth method, announcement coefficients are statistically insignificant (column four). When this method is applied to bank dimension, three out of four announcement coefficients are significant (column three). A comparison of columns three through five reveals that time effects (residuals correlated across different banks) dominate bank effects (residuals correlated through time). Under Driscoll-Kraay, announcement coefficients are statistically insignificant 13 The bias declines fast as the number of clusters increases. 14 Column two reproduces the benchmark specification of Table 4 (column five).
except for G (column five). Absent are too-big-to-fail or too-big-to-save policies (column six).
About announcement types, CAR for general (specific) announcements are significantly positive (negative) only for capital injections, whereas abnormal beta is positive only for G GUA .
In sum, empirical findings are sensitive to the method used to control for bank and time effects and change considerably as one moves from traditional to more recent approaches. The final message is that government announcements have exerted a very weak impact on bank returns. It follows that our evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that state aid to banks acted more like an insurance than needed financial support. In this connection, the fact that all large US banks redeemed all the state aids in less than a year from disbursement (a big coordinated redemption wave taking place in June 2009) quickly corroborates the insurance view of government assistance.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 , here]
MIXED APPROACH
Bank and time dummies correct the bias of OLS coefficients; more recent approaches, instead, adjust their SE. 15 Since both bank and time effects could have a fixed and a variable component, the natural step would be to avoid simultaneously both the omitted variable bias and residual correlation. We combine the two approaches into a mixed one. Table 7 shows results of this exercise for our three equations. All columns include bank and time dummies; for columns two through four we employ double-clustered SE, the most efficient method in the presence of many clusters, and for columns five through seven Driscoll-Kraay SE, a consistent method that is insensitive to the number of clusters. Petersen (2009) suggests a rule of thumb to select the best method. Clustered SE are best with more than 50 clusters for each of the two dimensions, whereas
Driscoll-Kraay SE is best otherwise. We report both methods because results could also be affected by large differences between the number of firm clusters and time clusters.
These two methods converge and are stabler than those of Tables 5 and 6 . The impact of government announcements on bank valuation is not statistically significant, with the exception of positive abnormal risks of specific announcements (columns two and five). There are three exceptions to this "fading star" effect. The first is the too-big-to-save effect for G (columns three and six) that is consistent with that of Table 5 . 16 The second is the lower and less significant abnormal beta for G GUA (columns four and seven). The third is the negative CAR and positive abnormal risk of S CAP (columns four and seven). 17 However, we stress that the null hypothesis of the joint significance of announcements is rejected in three out of six columns of Table 7 and is marginally significant in the other two columns. In sum, a careful treatment of bank and time effects stabilizes coefficient estimates and shows that government announcements of rescue plans have very weak effects on bank valuation.
[Insert Table 7 here]
ROBUSTNESS
We check the robustness of our findings with five separate exercises. The first estimates our three equations with bank-and-time dummies and double-clustered SE over a restricted subperiod. The second estimates the same three equations with bank-and-time dummies and Driscoll-Kraay SE for the entire period, but with two different bank subsamples. The reason for switching from double clustering to Driscoll-Kraay has to do with the higher efficiency of the latter when the number of clusters is low (Thompson, 2006; Petersen, 2009 On the second exercise, we rearrange our sample of countries in three large areas: the United
States, Europe and the Pacific. The vast majority of announcements occurs in the first two areas, making the Pacific a poor candidate as a subsample. Given that the first area consists of only one country (the United States), we drop time dummies because they are perfectly collinear with market index R M . To compare results, we adopt the same specification also for Europe. For both areas, we report estimates using Driscoll-Kraay SE because the number of firm clusters is lower than 50 (Table 8) . Announcements coefficients are statistically significant for the United States (columns four through six) and insignificant in Europe (columns seven through nine). We find a different pattern with respect to the whole sample. In the United States, announcements affect only CAR whereas in Europe only R m *G ALL has a significant coefficient. Both results corroborate the main hypothesis of positive G-induced effects and negative S-induced effects, but announcements impact weakly R i and differently across areas. Breaking down announcements by type, coefficients are statistically more significant and economically more relevant than those in Table 7 for the United
States subsample, whereas they vanish in Europe. The only exception is the negative coefficient of R m *S CAP (columns seven and eight). Two factors could drive these results beyond the absence of time dummies: the lack of policy coordination in Europe that undermines the credibility of government announcements, and the reputational benefit enjoyed by the United States as the financial leader of the world.
On the third exercise, we estimate our three equations applying alternatively two-day shorter and two-day longer windows than defined earlier (Table 9) . 18 Results for G tend to weaken as the window is enlarged. For S, instead, the opposite holds. We explain this pattern by the fact that the S evaluation process becomes more difficult as uncertainty rises with the deepening of the crisis. The overall message of the shorter and longer windows corroborates our earlier window selection.
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 , here]
On the fourth exercise, we separate the effects of the first from successive announcements to verify whether government credibility evaporates with successive bailout announcements (Table   10 ). Three out of four F-tests reject the hypothesis of no difference between estimated announcement coefficients. In these cases, successive announcements have larger coefficients in absolute value than first announcements, implying that there is no credibility loss with multiple government announcements (column one). The pattern is similar when we apply traditional approaches to control for firm and time effects (columns two and three). Under Driscoll-Kraay or double clustered SE, the positive abnormal risk for first S is the only statistically significant coefficient (columns four and five). The "fading effect" is sensitive to methodology, but it is independent of potential loss of credibility induced by multiple announcements. 18 We report estimates using double clustered SE, our best method in the presence of many firm and time clusters.
gamble for bank resurrection. For S, first announcements signal government intentions (e.g., soft government budget constraint) and hidden information (e.g., troubled banks), which enhance the credibility that the same strategy will be continued in the future. The persistence of this government strategy tends to exacerbate moral hazard behavior on the part of banks. Overall, our results are in line with the recent literature that finds weak or no impact of subsequent bailout announcements on bank valuation. Klomp (2010) [Insert Tables 10 and 11 , here]
Our last exercise checks the robustness of our results using a different definition of G and S. We assume that the bank-specific announcements that took place simultaneously from October 28, 2008 through November 11, 2008 in various countries were coordinated so as to be one big implicit general announcement aimed at shoring up international financial stability. For that purpose, we treat all S announcements over this 15-day window as a single G. Table 12 reports seven estimates of the benchmark specification using our different methodologies. New G and S coefficients have the same signs but, on average, lower intensity than the corresponding original coefficients. The Wald test of the joint statistical significance of all announcements with those S included in the 15-day window treated as a single G does not change for the first three columns of The overall conclusion of our robustness exercises is that the "fading effect" of the announcements that emerges from our empirical work is robust to different periods, geographical subsamples, and event windows; furthermore, the fading effect is not driven by the existence of multiple announcements or alternative definition.
[Insert Table 12 , here]
CONCLUSIONS
The great financial crisis of 2007-2009 prompted governments to inject vast sums of public funds into banks. Our paper has focused on the specific question of whether general and bank-specific announcements of government rescue plans were priced by the markets as cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal market risk during selected event-time windows. The paper also checks for the presence of too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save policies. The headline result is that general and specific announcements were priced by the market as cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal market risk under standard estimation techniques, but these effects weakened or disappeared altogether when equations were subject to more rigorous tests.
The standard estimation techniques are parametric approaches, using either dummy variables or FGLS. With these methods, general announcements generate positive abnormal returns and lower market risk, whereas specific announcements generate negative abnormal returns and higher market risk, as in FGLS. The reason for the difference in sign between general and specific announcement is that when government intervenes to support an individual bank, the market perceives the subsidy as a revelation of partially unknown trouble and penalizes the bank identified as a "bad apple".
The more rigorous estimation techniques address the important econometric issue of potential bank and time effects, that is the residuals of a given bank and/or day may be correlated across time periods and/or across different banks, respectively. When we correct for such effects, the coefficients associated with abnormal returns and market risk either lose statistical significance or manifest instability. This pattern of results is even clearer during the turbulent phase of the crisis and for European banks. US banks drive the findings, suggesting that the credibility of the announcements was sensitive to policy coordination. Europe had difficulty in coordinating their policies; in contrast, the United States had no coordination problem and also benefited from its role of the world's financial leader. We do not find evidence that the credibility of government announcements vanishes with multiple announcements. In sum, the overall conclusion is that announcement effects tend to fade away under closer econometric scrutiny.
Our results differ from findings obtained with different methodologies. For example, King (2009) finds, using event-study analysis, that announcements have the intended effects for US banks, but not for European banks. But, his methodology consists of applying country-by-country time series techniques that ignore cross-section dependence, a phenomenon that our paper has shown to generate large biases. In fact, we find that announcements impact more on risks than on returns. Moreover, our results are heterogeneous through different types of announcements.
The policy relevance of our findings is that government announcements of rescue plans were either not credible or deemed inadequate relative to the underlying financial difficulties of banks, particularly in Europe. It should be stressed that our analysis is limited to financial markets and to short-term reactions. Actual government interventions, as opposed to announcements of interventions, may exert positive effects on corporate borrowers' stock returns (Norden et al., 2012) or banks' loan supply (Li, 2012) . Therefore, it is quite possible that, in the long run, one can arrive at an altogether different assessment of the effectiveness of rescue plans, but this is beyond the scope of our paper. Another issue needs to be highlighted: all our tests fail to show clear evidence of too-big-to-fail policy suggesting at most a too-big-to-save effect. Again, our short-term focus (19) is equal to the number of multiple general announcements (when Total Number is larger than one). For specific announcements, Total Number is the number of government announcements aimed at supporting specific banks whereas Targeted Banks indicates not only how many banks are targeted by the government support, but also the number of first interventions in favor of targeted specific banks: the difference between Total Number and Targeted Banks is equal to the number of multiple specific announcements. Multiple specific announcements tend to be concentrated in few banks (not reported). 
R m 1.334*** 1.312*** 1.315*** 1.407*** 1.408*** 1.408*** (a) = same coefficients and significance levels using OLS with double clustered standard errors; (-/--/---) = one/two/three significance level(s) less than the corresponding estimate; (+/++/+++) = one/two/three significance level(s) more than the corresponding estimate. Variables: Ri = bank's rate of return (dependent variable); Rm = market's rate of return; SIZEREL = capitalization value of bank i relative to capitalization of all banks in the sample; G = general announcements; S = specific announcements; ALL = all type; specific announcements covering the period October 28, 2008 through November 11, 2008 have been aggregated as one general announcement with a 15-day event window: we apply consistently the two-trading day event windows of general announcements also to the implicit general announcement. Tests: F Test: joint statistical significance of the full specification; Ann. Wald: joint statistical significance of announcements (bold variables). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15 
